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(Re)Politicizing Inequalities: Movements, 
Parties, and Social Citizenship in Chile 
Kenneth M. Roberts 
Abstract: For 20 years following the 1989–1990 democratic transition, 
Chilean politics was characterized by stable forms of party-based political 
representation, relatively low levels of social mobilization, and a techno-
cratic consensus around a neoliberal development model that generated 
rapid and sustained, albeit highly unequal, patterns of economic growth. 
This sociopolitical matrix was challenged, however, when hundreds of 
thousands of students and their supporters took to the streets to protest 
against educational inequalities, while smaller numbers of protestors 
mobilized around a plethora of other labor, environmental, and indige-
nous rights claims. This wave of social protest occurred in a context of 
growing detachment of Chilean citizens from traditional parties and 
representative institutions, and it punctured the aura of inevitability and 
consensus that surrounded the country’s economic model. The ground-
swell of popular protest signified the end of a posttransition political era 
in Chile and the dawning of a new one defined by the repoliticization of 
social and economic inequalities, including vigorous debates about the 
social pillars of the neoliberal model and the reach of social citizenship 
rights. The Chilean case sheds new light on the processes by which ine-
qualities come to be politicized or depoliticized in different structural, 
institutional, and ideational contexts.  
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Introduction 
Challenges to democratic representation in contemporary Chile reflect, 
in part, a growing detachment of citizens from political parties and other 
formal representative institutions. This detachment, however, cannot 
simply be attributed to generalized political apathy or a withdrawal from 
political affairs. Instead, for many citizens and social groups, detachment 
from formal institutions is coupled with an increased propensity to en-
gage in collective action – that is, to mobilize politically – both outside and 
against party-mediated channels of interest representation. The mass 
protest movements of the second decade of the twenty-first century are 
the most visible manifestation of this extrainstitutional sociopolitical 
mobilization, and they demonstrate its inclination toward contentious 
modes of collective action and demand articulation (see McAdam, Tar-
row, and Tilly 2001).1  
As Tarrow suggests, contentious forms of collective action are in-
trinsically related to representational deficiencies. That is, they are em-
ployed by people “who lack regular access to representative institutions” 
and “act in the name of new or unaccepted claims” (Tarrow 2011: 7). 
Such deficiencies lie at the heart of social protest in contemporary Chile, 
as in other Latin American countries that experienced mass protests in 
recent decades (Roberts 2014). While a diverse array of social actors have 
engaged in protest activities in Chile – including students, workers, in-
digenous groups, and environmental activists – all have articulated claims 
that found little expression in the mainstream party organizations that 
dominated electoral and policy-making arenas under the post-1990 dem-
ocratic regime. Most of these claims were related to the “social deficits” 
of the neoliberal development model that Chile’s mainstream parties 
largely retained following the transition from military rule. Indeed, chal-
lenges to social and economic inequalities embedded within the neoliber-
al model have provided a type of “master frame” (Snow and Bedford 
1992) for diverse forms of contentious collective action outside formal 
channels of representation – a pattern that has previously been seen in 
other Latin American countries like Argentina, Venezuela, Bolivia, and 
Ecuador (Silva 2009). As such, the politicization of inequality – or, as 
explained below, its repoliticization – is central to understanding the 
                                                 
1  The author would like to thank Carolina Segovia, Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, 
and Rosanna Castiglioni for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
paper. 
The editors of this special issue would like to acknowledge support from the 
Chilean Millennium Science Initiative (project NS130008). 
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challenges confronted by representative institutions in contemporary 
Chilean democracy. 
For 20 years following the 1990 regime transition, Chilean democ-
racy was characterized by stable forms of party-based political represen-
tation, relatively low levels of social mobilization, and a technocratic 
consensus around neoliberal policies that generated rapid and sustained, 
yet highly unequal, patterns of economic growth. All three dimensions of 
this sociopolitical matrix were challenged, however, when hundreds of 
thousands of students and their supporters took to the streets in 2011 to 
protest against educational inequalities, while smaller numbers of protes-
tors mobilized around a plethora of other labor, environmental, and in-
digenous rights claims (see Donoso and von Bülow 2017). Breaking with 
a quarter century of relative societal quiescence and institutionalized 
political competition, this new wave of social protest outflanked Chile’s 
party system to the left and punctured the aura of inevitability and con-
sensus that surrounded the highly touted economic model. Although 
neither the activist networks nor the grievances they articulated were new 
to Chilean politics, their newfound capacity to mobilize large numbers of 
citizens to march, protest, occupy public spaces, and disrupt everyday 
activities marked a sea change in the national political arena.  
Indeed, the groundswell of popular protest signified the end of the 
posttransition political era and the dawning of a new one defined by the 
repoliticization of social and economic inequalities. Although inequalities 
were not entirely absent from the political agenda during the posttransi-
tion era, they were addressed in a highly technocratic fashion that de-
emphasized distributive conflict as an axis of partisan competition and 
largely eliminated it as a focal point of social mobilization. This techno-
cratic depoliticization changed abruptly when students rebelled en masse 
and forced Chile’s partisan and representative institutions to open new 
debates around the social pillars of the neoliberal model, the reach of 
social citizenship rights, and even the very constitutional foundations of 
the post-1990 democratic order.  
The Chilean case, then, is tailor-made for understanding how ine-
qualities come to be politicized or depoliticized in different structural, 
institutional, and ideational contexts. Although politicization has struc-
tural underpinnings in extant patterns of social stratification, it is inevita-
bly a historically contingent, agency-centered political process that is 
driven forward by social and political actors. These actors are generally 
collective in nature and potentially located at a wide range of different 
structural positions. A politicization process can assume top-down or 
bottom-up forms and is subject to a myriad of organizational expres-
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sions and institutional channels that mediate between these different 
levels.  
This paper thus problematizes the process of politicizing inequali-
ties, breaking with recent influential work that assumes the character and 
intensity of distributive conflicts can be deduced directly from underlying 
structures of inequality (see Boix 2003; Acemoglu and Robinson 2006). 
Following a more constructivist logic, I argue that the politicization of 
inequalities is neither a given nor a structural imperative; it is, instead, a 
contingent and varying outcome of historically situated processes of 
sociopolitical mobilization, competition, and conflict. Political agency is 
central to such processes, which are heavily conditioned by the social 
construction and strategic behavior of collective actors like political par-
ties, civil society organizations, and social movements.  
Where partisan and electoral competition do not politicize inequali-
ties – that is, where parties ignore or downplay distributive outcomes and 
compete on the basis of other forms of political differentiation – the 
political agenda may be strikingly divorced from underlying structural 
inequalities. Such depoliticization, however, is largely predicated on soci-
etal quiescence, as it is susceptible to social and political mobilization 
outside established representative institutions by collective actors who 
articulate claims that mainstream parties do not recognize or accept. 
Chile’s governing parties, for example, downplayed structural inequalities 
in the education system by trying to expand access to private higher 
education, believing that tuition credits and student loans would create 
new educational opportunities and enhance individual social mobility. 
The student movement, by contrast, mobilized around claims for fun-
damental institutional reforms that would eliminate private profits from 
the education system and establish free universal public education – 
demands that went far beyond the limited measures that were initially 
entertained by the political establishment.  
To explain these dynamics, this article traces the process by which 
inequalities were first depoliticized and then repoliticized during Chile’s 
contemporary democratic period, focusing on the interplay between 
institutional and societal actors – in particular, political parties and social 
movements. I then draw from public opinion survey data to analyze 
protest behavior at the microlevel and explore its demographic, political, 
and attitudinal correlates. The analysis demonstrates that the activation 
of concerns related to social needs and inequalities lies at the heart of 
recent cycles of contentious politics in Chile. While much of this activa-
tion occurs outside established partisan channels, some of it also takes 
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place among party members or sympathizers who support more vigor-
ous state efforts to address social problems. 
Conceptualizing the Politicization of Inequality 
The politics of inequality have occupied a prominent place on Chile’s 
political landscape for most of the past century, although they have 
played out in remarkably diverse and shifting ways. Managing social and 
economic inequalities has been a central concern of Chilean democratic 
governments since the 1920s, and distributive conflicts were at the heart 
of democratic breakdowns – and subsequent periods of authoritarian 
closure – in the 1920s and 1970s. Even by Latin American standards, the 
ebbs and flows of Chilean politics have been heavily conditioned by 
cyclical patterns of politicizing and depoliticizing inequalities, which have 
created marked cohort and generational effects in the national body 
politic.  
These cyclical patterns help to shed light on the limitations of dom-
inant theoretical approaches to the study of democracy and inequality. 
Building on the pioneering formal model of Meltzer and Richard (1981), 
the celebrated studies of Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson 
(2006) make two critical assumptions: (1) that democratic regimes re-
spond to the policy preferences of the median voter, and (2) that these 
preferences naturally incline toward redistributive measures under condi-
tions of inequality, since the income of the median voter is necessarily 
lower than the mean income in society when wealth is concentrated 
among the few. For all their game-theoretic, microanalytic rigor, such 
rationalist approaches ultimately rest on highly structuralist foundations, 
as regime and distributive outcomes are both derived from the aggrega-
tion of individual preferences based on structural locations on the in-
come scale. Political institutions, then – whether democratic, authoritari-
an, or revolutionary – are treated as a function of distributive conflict.  
As in any structuralist approach, these works lack an appreciation 
for the relative autonomy of the political sphere and the role of political 
agency, including the ideational underpinnings of strategic behavior. 
When politics is factored in, both of the aforementioned assumptions are 
rendered highly contingent and variable; democratic regimes may not 
respond to the policy preferences of the median voter, and popular ma-
jorities may not express preferences – much less mobilize politically – for 
redistributive outcomes. A wide array of institutional, behavioral, and 
ideational factors can cause democratic outcomes to deviate from struc-
turally derived rationalist assumptions. From above, these assumptions 
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largely ignore the potential distortionary effects of concentrated wealth 
on democratic institutions and policy-making processes, since economic 
elites possess a wide array of wealth-based political resources, access, and 
influence that can compensate for their limited numbers (Winters 2011; 
Gilens 2012). From below, these assumptions radically discount the 
political challenges of aggregating individual preferences behind a majori-
tarian collective project for redistributive outcomes. The latter, for ex-
ample, is often undermined by (i) patterns of patron-clientelism that in-
duce low-income voters to prioritize particularistic benefits over broader 
redistributive measures, (ii) political competition focused on widely 
shared valence issues (such as economic growth, clean government, or 
law and order) rather than divisive positional issues (such as redistribu-
tion), or (iii) the political salience of nonredistributive cultural issues and 
identities for many low-income citizens.  
Indeed, as Schattschneider emphasizes (1960: 101–110), social and 
economic inequalities can have an exclusionary political effect: by skew-
ing the functioning of democratic institutions and the content of public 
policy toward the interests of the well-to-do, they alienate and deactivate 
the poor, who disproportionally abstain from democratic participation 
even when they possess formal suffrage rights. Furthermore, as Castillo 
(2012) demonstrates in the Chilean case, some degree of inequality tends 
to become “normalized” and even justified by both elite and popular 
sectors, rather than serving as a focal point of democratic contestation. 
Finally, even where popular majorities do prefer redistributive out-
comes, such preferences are not automatically aggregated and channeled 
into institutional and policy-making arenas. Political organization is es-
sential to translate the weight in numbers of lower class groups into a 
coherent political force, inevitably posing significant collective action 
problems to any redistributive project (Ansell and Samuels 2014: 41–42). 
Patterns of civic and partisan organization are thus crucial for determin-
ing whether and how the redistributive interests of popular sectors 
achieve effective institutional representation (see Huber and Stephens 
2012). 
There are no guarantees, then, that democratic competition will turn 
on distributive issues or that social and economic inequalities will even 
be politically salient. Where lower classes are politically fragmented or 
disorganized, incorporated politically through elite-controlled clientelist 
networks, or mobilized through valence issues or cultural appeals that do 
not entail redistributive commitments, democratic institutions may very 
well reproduce or even accentuate structural inequalities. This conclusion 
is an analytical complement to recent work that challenges Boix (2003) 
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and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) by arguing that the origins of de-
mocracy can often be found in efforts to regulate and institutionalize 
elite competition rather than in redistributive pressures from below 
(Haggard and Kaufman 2012; Ansell and Samuels 2014).  
Whatever the origins of democracy, however, economic elites inevi-
tably confront the challenge of safeguarding their minority interests in 
institutional settings of majority rule. The dominant strategy for elite 
actors is thus to depoliticize inequalities – that is, to preclude distributive 
issues from becoming a focal point of democratic contestation by popu-
lar majorities. Such depoliticization has two central components. First, it 
requires that partisan and electoral competition revolve around issues or 
competitive axes that lower the salience of distributive conflicts and do 
not cleave the electorate along class lines. The aforementioned patterns 
of clientelist, valence, or cultural competition that cut across class lines 
are thus likely to be favored by elite actors who seek to minimize redis-
tributive pressures from below. In other words, parties with elite core 
constituencies seek to mobilize working- and lower-class support 
through clientelist linkages or an emphasis on valence issues like eco-
nomic growth, “modernization,” or law and order. Second, depoliticiza-
tion requires the containment of social and civic mobilization outside the 
partisan/electoral arena by actors pursuing redistributive goals. Since 
democratic rights and liberties preclude a reliance on coercive instru-
ments of demobilization, effective containment is likely to rest on the 
political and organizational fragmentation of popular sectors and the 
collective action problems they face.  
Naturally, such depoliticization is hard to sustain in contexts of 
acute social and economic inequalities such as those found in Latin 
America. Both social and political actors are sure to try to politicize ine-
qualities by making distributive issues a focal point of democratic contes-
tation. Politicization occurs from the top-down when political parties or 
leaders are able to mobilize significant blocs of voters behind redistribu-
tive platforms and thus structure electoral competition and public policy-
making processes around rival positions on distributive issues. Politiciza-
tion can also occur from the bottom-up when social movements, civic 
organizations, or strategically positioned societal stakeholders acquire 
sufficient mobilizational capacity to influence national policy-making 
agendas or induce institutional actors to respond to their claims. Such 
effects are especially likely where social movements are capable of dis-
rupting everyday activities through large-scale social protests, strikes, 
street blockades, or occupations of public or private sites.  
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As explained in a recent report by the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP 2015b: 15), politicization entails an attempt to in-
corporate an issue into the political field of collective decision making. 
Absent politicization issues are typically relegated to the private spheres 
of family or interpersonal relations, civic engagement, or market ex-
changes. They are not, in other words, subject to the regulatory interven-
tion of collective decision-making procedures under democratic institu-
tions. To politicize, therefore, inevitably involves conflict between socie-
tal actors who seek to keep an issue in the private domain and those who 
aim to inject it into the public sphere where it can be subjected to collec-
tive decision-making processes. Politicization is first and foremost a 
process of expanding the political sphere of collective decision-making 
and reshaping the policy-making agenda. 
This conceptualization of politicization is especially instructive for 
understanding the politics of inequality in contemporary Chile. Chile’s 
post-1990 democratic regime not only inherited a political landscape 
where parties, labor unions, and other social actors who traditionally 
politicized inequalities had been heavily repressed; it also inherited a 
highly privatized and commodified market economy that relegated a 
wide range of social outcomes to the private sphere, at least partially 
insulating technocratic rulers from popular democratic demands. Alt-
hough all of Latin America adopted neoliberal macroeconomic structural 
adjustment policies in the 1980s and 1990s (Edwards 1995; Lora 2001), 
Chile went the furthest in constructing the “social pillars” of Polanyi’s 
“market society” (Polanyi 1944) through the liberalization of labor mar-
kets and the large-scale privatization of health care, education, and social 
security. These social pillars – education in particular – have been at the 
forefront of recent efforts to repoliticize inequalities in Chile, where 
leftist parties and social movements have sought to redefine basic ser-
vices as universal social citizenship rights that are subject to collective 
decision-making processes, rather than private goods that are allocated 
unequally by the marketplace.  
Dictatorship, Democracy, and Depoliticization in 
Chile 
Chile has a long and storied tradition of politicizing inequalities under 
democracy. Unlike any other country in the Western Hemisphere, Chile 
developed both mass-based socialist and communist parties (the Partido 
Socialista de Chile, PSCh, and the Partido Comunista de Chile, PCCh), 
which both had strong ties to organized labor by the 1930s. These par-
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ties participated in three consecutive center-left Popular Front govern-
ments until the Radical Party-led coalition dissolved and the PCCh was 
repressed as the Cold War spread to Latin America in the late 1940s. 
After a period of fragmentation and decline, a reorganized PSCh joined 
the PCCh in a new leftist electoral coalition in the late 1950s, which 
eventually elected Salvador Allende to the presidency in 1970 – the first 
elected Marxist head of state in the history of Latin America. Arguably 
the most radical experiment in democratic socialism the world has ever 
seen, the Allende government moved quickly to redistribute large land-
holdings, nationalize banks and basic industries, increase wages, and 
launch redistributive social programs. Allende’s reforms triggered wide-
spread mobilization by labor and peasant unions and community organi-
zations along with a furious countermobilization by business interests – 
which declared a capital strike – and their middle- and upper-class allies 
(see Stallings 1978; Winn 1986). Chile under Allende thus presented an 
especially acute form of the class-based distributive conflicts theorized 
by Boix (2003) and Acemoglu and Robinson (2006), but tempered in 
most real-world democratic settings.  
The 1973 military coup that demolished Allende’s “democratic road 
to socialism” was intended not only to reverse his socialist reforms but 
to employ overwhelming military force to repress the parties and unions 
that backed them, demobilize their grassroots constituencies, and impose 
an authoritarian political order that was closed to societal claims (Rem-
mer 1980). By 1975 the military regime had begun to impose the eco-
nomic corollary to this coercive depoliticization: the most doctrinaire 
and comprehensive program of neoliberal structural adjustment that 
Latin America had ever seen. Implemented by University of Chicago–
trained Chilean technocrats who were insulated from societal pressures 
by military rule, these neoliberal reforms dismantled trade protections 
and price controls, privatized industries and social services, slashed pub-
lic spending and employment, and liberalized labor and capital markets 
(Foxley 1983; Silva 1996).  
With leftist parties banned and driven underground by Pinochet’s 
secret police, and with peasant and labor unions in steep decline (Rob-
erts 1998), Chile’s veritable market revolution encountered little orga-
nized resistance during its initial phase of implementation. Massive re-
sistance erupted in 1983, however, following the collapse of the liberal-
ized financial system and the onset of a severe recession in the midst of 
the region-wide debt crisis. After a decade of coercive deactivation, Chil-
ean society quickly remobilized as the economic crisis weakened the 
dictatorship, provoking internal dissention within the ranks of the mili-
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tary regime and among its technocratic and business supporters (see 
Silva 1996). The call for a day of national protest by the copper workers’ 
federation in May 1983 sparked a three-year uprising against the dictator-
ship and its economic model, which entailed broad participation from a 
wide range of labor, women’s, youth, human rights, and community 
organizations. Increasingly, however, shantytown youth comprised the 
core of the protest movement as political violence escalated, with inten-
sified military repression and the emergence of a PCCh-backed armed 
insurgency (Garretón 1989b). 
This resurgence of social mobilization coincided with a revival of 
opposition parties, with the centrist Christian Democrats (PDC) and a 
moderate faction of the deeply splintered PSCh spearheading an effort to 
negotiate a regime transition with civilian representatives of the dictator-
ship. Thus, opposition forces were split between those who believed that 
mass protest and popular insurrection could drive the regime from pow-
er, and those who thought popular insurrection against a professional 
military was futile and that a negotiated transition offered the only path 
away from the dictatorship. The turning point came in late 1986 and into 
1987, when the protest movement began to wane, the economy began a 
long-term recovery, and the dictatorship moved to implement plans for a 
1988 plebiscite on Pinochet’s rule under the terms of the regime’s 1980 
constitution. With the regime opening spaces for parties to regain legal 
status and resume political activities, a 16-party coalition of centrist and 
moderate left opposition parties known as the Concertación poured its 
energy into the plebiscite campaign, hoping to defeat the dictatorship 
where it was weakest: in the polling booth. Unable to sustain the protest 
movement and its strategy of popular rebellion when institutional chan-
nels were beginning to open, the PCCh reluctantly and belatedly joined 
the plebiscite campaign, but it remained outside the Concertación alliance 
(see Roberts 1998).  
Chile transitioned to democracy when the opposition coalition de-
feated Pinochet in the 1988 plebiscite, negotiated a package of constitu-
tional reforms with the regime, and proceeded to win competitive presi-
dential elections in December 1989. However, along three critical dimen-
sions, the logic of the regime transition and the balance of power that 
undergirded it erected formidable obstacles to the politicization of ine-
qualities under the new democratic regime. 
First, despite the negotiation of constitutional reforms, the military 
regime left behind a series of authoritarian enclaves and institutional 
restrictions on popular sovereignty that would limit political and eco-
nomic reforms under the new government of the Concertación. Most 
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prominently, the Constitution allowed Pinochet to appoint a bloc of 
senators who gave conservative forces an unelected majority in the upper 
house of Congress, while electoral legislation established an ingeniously 
disproportional binomial system of representation that kept the PCCh 
outside of Congress and enabled the overrepresentation of the country’s 
second largest electoral bloc – the conservative alliance between the 
National Renovation (Renovación Nacional, RN) and the Independent 
Democratic Union (Unión Demócrata Independiente, UDI). Even 
though it possessed an electoral majority, the center-left governing coali-
tion could therefore not adopt reforms on its own; no legislation could 
pass without the support of conservative members of Congress who 
were affiliated with parties that were staunch defenders of Pinochet’s 
legacy. This conservative legislative veto placed major constraints on 
institutional and socioeconomic reforms under the new democratic re-
gime. 
Second, although the center-left parties that comprised the Concer-
tación had been bitter opponents of the “Chicago Boys” neoliberal model 
and its attendant inequalities for most of the authoritarian period, they 
cautiously backed away from this critical stance during the period of 
regime transition. In part, this reflected the dynamism of the Chilean 
economy that had become evident by the second half of the 1980s, in-
cluding the rapid development of new agricultural and natural resource-
based export sectors. It was also attributable a shift within the regime to 
a less doctrinaire and more pragmatic technocratic leadership team fol-
lowing the financial collapse of 1982–1983 (Silva 1996). At a time when 
neighboring countries in Latin America were still mired in debt and infla-
tionary crises and embracing versions of Chile’s free market reforms to 
stabilize their own economies, Chile’s accelerating growth and price 
stability helped to reinforce business support for Pinochet and his ne-
oliberal model. Indeed, it ensured that much of the business sector 
would vigorously oppose any regime transition that threatened continuity 
of the neoliberal model.  
Recognizing that business cooperation would be vital to political 
and economic stability under a new democratic regime, the Concertación 
parties tempered their criticisms of neoliberalism, acknowledged the new 
dynamism in the Chilean economy, and sought to reassure business elites 
that their interests would be protected in any process of regime transi-
tion. They backed away from the protest movement of the mid-1980s, 
and the newly reunified PSCh moved toward the center to align with the 
PDC, making a definitive break with their historic allies from the PCCh 
and its stridently antineoliberal, quasi-insurrectionary line (Garretón 
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1989a). In the process the parties of the Concertación channeled activists 
from social spheres into more institutionalized electoral activities that did 
not require sustained popular mobilization (Oxhorn 1995). They pledged 
to address social needs within the parameters of the neoliberal model 
itself, so as to avoid a return to the class and ideological polarization of 
the Allende period. Once in office, they adopted a technocratic approach 
to social policy and increased spending on targeted poverty relief pro-
grams without politicizing class inequalities, promising major redistribu-
tive measures in election campaigns, or mobilizing popular constituen-
cies outside the electoral arena as a counterweight to elite interests (see 
Torcal and Mainwaring 2003). As Soto Zamorano (2016) demonstrates, 
the platforms and discourse of the Concertación in the first decade follow-
ing Chile’s regime transition did not emphasize inequality per se but 
rather focused on poverty reduction and enhanced social mobility 
through a more inclusive pattern of economic growth. 
Third, this depoliticization of inequalities from above, in the parti-
san sphere, was complemented by social demobilization from below. 
The combination of political repression, economic crisis, and market 
restructuring had decimated the ranks of the labor and peasant move-
ments at the core of Allende’s experiment, while Pinochet’s labor law 
placed ongoing restrictions on unionization and collective bargaining 
(Roberts 1998; Kurtz 2004). Likewise, the shantytown youth and other 
prodemocratic social movements behind the 1983–1986 protest cycle 
largely demobilized as traditional parties reemerged and “contentious 
politics” gave way to institutionalized forms of partisan and electoral 
competition (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001; Oxhorn 1995). With (i) 
the dictatorship removed as a focal point for varied forms of opposition 
protest, (ii) institutionalized channels of representation opening, and (iii) 
the dominant parties prioritizing political pacts and economic stability, 
the restoration of democratic civil and political liberties after 17 years of 
dictatorship did not generate a surge of social mobilization around redis-
tributive claims. Although labor unions, Mapuche indigenous organiza-
tions, and student activists articulated claims that challenged existing 
inequalities, none possessed the mobilizational capacity to force main-
stream parties to accept their demands or to disrupt daily life and public 
institutions until their claims were addressed in policy-making arenas. As 
O’Donnell and Schmitter (1986) theorize, the “resurrection of civil so-
ciety” occurred before the regime transition itself – indeed, it was indis-
pensable in driving the transition process forward – but it quickly sub-
sided once institutional actors and channels had been restored.  
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Nevertheless, when inequalities were finally repoliticized in Chile 
some 20 years later, it would occur primarily along this third dimension 
of social mobilization from below, and largely in opposition to the first 
two dimensions of regime and partisan institutions. It is to that process 
that I now turn. 
Social Protest and Repoliticization 
The sociopolitical and institutional landscape that congealed during 
Chile’s democratic transition proved to be highly resilient, especially in 
comparison to the political turmoil and institutional fluidity found in 
much of the rest of Latin America. Elsewhere in the region democratic 
regimes and party systems, rather than a military dictatorship, assumed 
responsibility for imposing structural adjustment policies during the 
economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, and these institutions bore the 
attendant political costs. These costs were especially severe in countries 
where labor-based populist or leftist parties had taken the lead in the 
adoption of market reforms that clashed with their traditional statist and 
redistributive platforms. In countries like Venezuela, Argentina, Bolivia, 
and Ecuador such patterns of “bait-and-switch” liberalization dealigned 
party systems programmatically and left them without institutionalized 
channels to dissent from market orthodoxy. This dissent was eventually 
channeled into mass-based, anti-systemic forms of social and electoral 
protest in the late 1990s and the first decade of the twenty-first century, 
culminating in a series of presidential resignations, the partial or com-
plete breakdown of traditional party systems, and the election of populist 
outsiders or new “movement parties” from outside the political estab-
lishment (see Silva 2009; Roberts 2014).  
Chile, it appeared, had escaped such a fate. Chile was the only coun-
try in the region to consolidate a comprehensive program of market 
reforms under a military dictatorship, insulating parties from the direct 
political costs of managing structural adjustment. When the parties re-
turned to office in 1990, the country was in the early stages of a long-
term cycle of rapid market-driven growth, which allowed the Concertación 
to put new energy and resources into social programs without running 
the risks of major redistributive efforts. After the election of the PDC’s 
Patricio Aylwin in 1990, the Concertación was able to negotiate a modest 
increase in the income tax with conservative members of Congress, al-
lowing for a gradual rise in social spending on housing, health, and fami-
ly allowance programs (Weyland 1997). Although Congress blocked 
efforts by the government to adopt significant reforms to the labor code 
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that would have expanded collective bargaining and encouraged unioni-
zation, the booming economy allowed wages to increase and employ-
ment to expand. Poverty rates thus fell sharply after 1990, even if the 
Gini index of income inequality remained stubbornly high (World Bank 
2002). 
In the short term, rising living standards undoubtedly helped Chile 
avoid the kinds of social mobilization and mass protest that other coun-
tries in the region experienced during periods of ongoing economic 
hardship. Likewise, electoral stability was encouraged by the deep socio-
political cleavage between pro- and anti-Pinochet blocs that structured 
competition and “sorted” the electorate under the new democratic re-
gime (Valenzuela, Somma, and Scully forthcoming). This cleavage had 
both regime and economic components, as it divided authoritarians from 
democrats as well as supporters from opponents of the neoliberal model. 
To be sure, the economic component of this cleavage “softened” as the 
PSCh broke with the PCCh, moved into an alliance with the PDC, and 
grudgingly accepted the macroeconomic tenets of the neoliberal model. 
The cleavage was never erased, however, as the left-wing of the Concer-
tación continued to advocate labor and social policy reforms that diverged 
from the neoliberal orthodoxy of conservative parties, the UDI in par-
ticular.  
As poverty rates fell and Chilean society became more affluent, 
both the Concertación and its conservative opponents began to discuss 
inequality themes more openly in their platforms and electoral campaigns 
in the second decade of democratic rule. Although both coalitions advo-
cated expanding opportunities for education and employment in a con-
text of steady economic growth, the left wing of the Concertación was also 
willing to frame the issues in terms of citizenship rights to basic social 
goods (Soto Zamorano 2016). This subtle shift in elite political discourse 
helped to place social and economic inequalities on the political agenda, 
cautiously politicizing them from the top-down. It did so in a way, how-
ever, that was relatively consensual and technocratic. This technocratic 
approach avoided sharply polarizing the public policy-making arena or 
triggering social mobilization from below. 
In the second democratic decade the leadership of the Concertación 
also shifted leftward with the election of PSCh presidents Ricardo Lagos 
and Michelle Bachelet, following two PDC presidents in the 1990s. Re-
forms under Lagos eliminated the institution of designated senators and 
introduced a new program of universal coverage for basic health care 
needs, while Bachelet adopted a new public pension plan to expand 
social security to sectors of society that were excluded from or inade-
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quately covered in the private pension system. Both PSCh presidents, 
therefore, reformed one of the privatized and commodified social pillars 
of the neoliberal model, pushing public policy in the direction of univer-
sal social citizenship rights (see Pribble 2013). However, these reforms 
maintained the technocratic logic of public policy making in Chile as 
they provided little impetus for social mobilization.  
Nonetheless, this sociopolitical landscape of institutional stability, 
gradual technocratic social reform, and ongoing social demobilization 
began to show strains over the course of Bachelet’s term in office (2006–
2010). At the institutional level the stability of partisan and electoral 
competition contrasted with growing signs of societal detachment from 
established parties and representative institutions; this was the case espe-
cially among young people who had come of age politically since the 
regime transition. This could be seen in declining levels of partisan iden-
tification and participation in election campaigns, both of which ranked 
near the bottom in the Latin American region. In the 2010 surveys of the 
Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP), Chile paradoxically 
ranked last in the region with a mere 11.6 percent of respondents sympa-
thizing with a political party despite its electoral stability (Luna, Zech-
meister, and Seligson 2010: 170). Voter registration and turnout plum-
meted after the democratic transition, especially among youth; the per-
centage of the voting-age population that voted dropped steadily from 
86 percent in 1989 to 59.6 percent in 2009 (UNDP 2015a: 34). By the 
end of Bachelet’s first administration, Chileans ranked last in Latin 
America in relation to the percentage of survey respondents who ex-
pressed an interest in politics (28.6 percent) and second lowest in relation 
to the percentage who said they had attended a municipal government or 
council meeting (4 percent) (Luna, Zechmeister, and Seligson 2010: 135, 
143).  
In many respects, this detachment from established representative 
institutions was in keeping with Schattschneider’s (1960) expectations 
regarding the alienating and deactivating effects of egregious inequalities. 
Among a subset of the population, however, detachment did not neces-
sarily indicate a withdrawal from politics altogether; to the contrary, it 
was a prelude to a reactivation of civil society around a series of issues 
and social claims that mainstream parties had largely neglected. As doc-
umented by Somma and Medel (2017), social protest activity steadily 
increased after 2003–2004, culminating in the surge of educational and 
environmental protests in 2011–2012. Students, subcontract workers, 
indigenous groups, and environmental activists were at the forefront of 
this social mobilization, which expanded the scope of the policy-making 
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debate and sharpened the differences between rival forces in a way that 
was unprecedented under the new democratic regime.  
This trend toward increasing social mobilization reflected several 
subtle shifts in the Chilean political context in the second decade of 
democracy. The threat of reverting to authoritarian rule clearly receded 
over time as the democratic regime consolidated and successfully man-
aged economic growth. Indeed, the aging former dictator Pinochet spent 
his final years under house arrest waging legal battles to avoid trial for 
human rights violations. As such, the regime cleavage between authori-
tarians and democrats eroded over time, and the extreme caution that 
marked the early posttransition period waned. Meanwhile, the health care 
and pension reforms of PSCh presidents Lagos and Bachelet focused 
new attention on social citizenship rights but also exposed the limitations 
of these rights under the prevailing neoliberal model, despite rapid and 
sustained economic growth under a succession of center-left govern-
ments. These limitations, especially in the spheres of education and labor 
rights, became focal points of social mobilization and political contesta-
tion under Bachelet, the fourth (and final) administration of the Concer-
tación. 
Therefore, social and economic inequalities were largely repoliti-
cized by societal actors from below and from outside the party system, 
which is in sharp contrast to Chile’s pre-1973 democratic experience. 
Indeed, repoliticization increasingly occurred in opposition to traditional 
parties altogether. Although detachment from mainstream parties took 
place across the political spectrum, the repoliticization of inequalities 
essentially outflanked the party system on the left. Detachment and out-
flanking are thus related but distinct phenomena. Outflanking to the left 
had two principal dimensions: one programmatic, one organizational. 
First, on the programmatic front, it signified the articulation of claims 
that were substantially more challenging to market orthodoxy than those 
supported by the PSCh and its allied offshoot, the Party for Democracy 
(PPD), within the Concertación. As Castillo, Madero-Cabib, and Salamo-
vich (2013) demonstrate, programmatic differentiation among the main-
stream parties of the left and right had progressively faded in Chile, but 
the protest movements broke the trend toward convergence and revived 
programmatic contestation. For example, the copper-mining movement 
of subcontract workers launched the longest labor strike in the demo-
cratic period in 2007, pressing claims for bonuses and collective bargain-
ing rights that challenged the “entire legal framework” undergirding 
Chile’s neoliberal model of “flexibilized” labor relations (Donoso 2013b: 
2–3). Similarly, the “Patagonia Without Dams” environmental move-
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ment, which sparked major protests against hydroelectric projects in 
2011, criticized the subordination of environmental concerns to eco-
nomic development goals and the profit motives of domestic and trans-
national private energy companies (Schaeffer 2017).  
However, programmatic outflanking to the left was most dramatic 
in the education sector, a social pillar of the neoliberal model that the 
Concertación’s cautious technocratic reforms had left largely intact. Alt-
hough successive governments of the Concertación had launched new 
programs of targeted spending on schools in low-income districts and 
subsidized an expansion of the school day, “there was never any attempt 
to alter the general structure of the education sector” (Pribble 2013: 97). 
Education had been decentralized and partially privatized by the military 
regime in the early 1980s, and the process of privatization deepened 
following the democratic transition; the percentage of elementary and 
middle school students in public schools decreased from nearly 80 per-
cent in 1980 to less than 60 percent in 1990, and it continued to fall 
under the Concertación to around 40 percent in 2010 (Bidegain Ponte 
2015: 193). Students in poor municipalities typically remained in low-
quality public schools, while middle-class families struggled to cover 
tuition charges at publicly subsidized private schools with selective ad-
missions requirements. Although the percentage of students pursuing 
postsecondary education increased sharply as for-profit private universi-
ties, vocational schools, and technical institutes proliferated – offering 
widely varying qualities of education – government subsidies and schol-
arship programs were unable to equalize access to higher education or 
prevent tuition debt burdens from rising. As the Organisation for Eco-
nomic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2004: 254–255) report-
ed, Chile’s education system “was consciously class-structured” and 
“highly stratified” in terms of access to quality education at all levels of 
instruction; students from lower-income families and public school 
backgrounds were largely excluded from leading institutions of higher 
education by the combination of steep tuition fees and competitive ad-
missions standards.  
The student rebellion took direct aim at the privatized, market-
based logic of this education system, which both reflected and repro-
duced class inequalities in Chilean society. In April 2006 small-scale pro-
tests by high school students angered by the collapse of a public school 
roof and delays in the delivery of school transport passes quickly swelled 
into a much larger series of demonstrations against educational inequali-
ties. Marches associated with a national student strike culminated in 
violent clashes with the police and over a thousand arrests in early May. 
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When newly elected President Bachelet criticized the unrest, student 
organizations responded with a wave of sit-ins that paralyzed hundreds 
of schools and mobilized over 130,000 secondary students (Donoso 
2013b: 10–11). Although Bachelet quieted the so-called Pingüino Rebel-
lion – named so because the students wore black-and-white uniforms – 
by creating an advisory commission to dialogue with student and teacher 
representatives and developing a proposal for education reforms, the 
package of reforms that finally worked its way through Congress in 2009 
was so watered down that it left intact the basic structure of the privat-
ized education system (Pribble 2013: 104–105).  
Widely interpreted as a betrayal by the student movement (Bidegain 
Ponte 2015: 252–255), the 2009 education reform set the stage for the 
2011–2012 explosion of protests by university students against Bach-
elet’s conservative successor, Sebastian Piñera. If the Concertación’s 20-
year cycle in office had left deep structural inequalities intact, the pro-
spects for significant redistributive reform would be clearly diminished 
under a new conservative administration that staunchly supported the 
neoliberal model. As the window for redistributive reform closed and the 
moderate left went from being the government to being the opposition, 
student activists triggered the largest and most sustained cycle of social 
mobilization the country had seen since the mid-1980s. Hundreds of 
universities and secondary schools were closed by student occupations, 
and over 900 demonstrations occurred across the country on a national 
day of protest in August 2011 (Guzman-Concha 2012: 410).  
With support from teachers’ unions, professors, and the national la-
bor confederation, the student movement called for an end to for-profit 
education and demanded free universal public education at all levels of 
instruction. These demands clearly outflanked the party system on the 
left programmatically as they demanded structural reform of the highly 
privatized education system, and not merely new forms of government 
spending or quality improvements like the Concertación had offered. This 
politicization of inequality also outflanked the party system to the left 
organizationally, as the political leadership of both secondary and univer-
sity student organizations moved progressively leftward over time. Fol-
lowing the democratic transition, student activists from the PDC and the 
PSCh assumed leadership roles in the major student federations; howev-
er, by the latter part of the 1990s and the first part of the twenty-first 
century PCCh student leaders and independent radical left networks 
known as “social collectives” were moving into the forefront. With their 
staunch criticisms of the education system, their emphasis on organiza-
tion through popular assemblies, and their preference for confrontation-
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al forms of protest over negotiations with the government, the PCCh 
and independent left networks controlled two-thirds of the university 
student federations represented in the powerful Confederation of Chile-
an Students (CONFECH) by 2005 (Bidegain Ponte 2015: 235). They 
also played central roles in the 2006 and 2011 student uprisings (Donoso 
2013a: 6–7). Indeed, even the PCCh lost ground to independent left 
groups in the student movement as it joined a reconfigured center-left 
alliance with the old parties of the Concertación in advance of the 2013 
elections that returned Bachelet to the presidency. 
As such, the politicization of inequalities in Chile was embedded 
within a complex, highly contradictory process of societal detachment 
from established parties and representative institutions. For some Chile-
ans, institutional detachment undoubtedly reflected an apolitical with-
drawal from public affairs of any sort. For others, however, it reflected 
an alienation from institutions that had largely ceased to offer meaning-
ful alternatives for issues of major importance to their daily lives –
particularly those related to social needs and inequalities. This latter sub-
group was, in fact, highly political; at the very least, it was available for 
oppositional forms of political mobilization around these social claims. 
Other citizens continued to identify with established parties but nonethe-
less supported protest activities that pressured these parties to respond 
more aggressively to social claims. 
Social Claims and the Activation of Protest  
Behavior: An Analysis of Survey Data 
These tendencies are evident in the 2015 national survey of Chilean citi-
zens by the Universidad Diego Portales, which included questions on 
political attitudes and participation, including participation in protest 
activities.2 In the survey 12.1 percent of respondents claimed to have 
participated in at least one of five different types of protest activity in the 
previous year: strikes, demonstrations, street blockades, property dam-
age, or the occupation of a building. As seen in Table 1, over a third of 
protest participants (36.9 percent) identified with a political party, more 
than double the rate of party identifiers (17.6 percent) among nonprotes-
tors. Therefore, citizens who protested were more, not less, likely to iden-
tify with political parties, but they engaged in protest activity to articulate 
                                                 
2  The survey is available at <http://encuesta.udp.cl/>. Calculations reported in 
this paper are based on the author’s analysis of the survey data. See the Appen-
dix for a description of variables.  
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claims that remained poorly represented or to pressure established insti-
tutions to be more responsive.  
Table 1.  Social Protest and Party Identification 
 Protest Participants Nonprotestors 
Party Identifiers 
58 
(36.9) 
201 
(17.6) 
Nonpartisans 
99 
(63.1) 
944 
(82.4) 
Total 157 (100.0) 
1,145 
(100.0) 
Source:  Encuesta Nacional UDP (2015). Calculations by the author; see Appendix for a 
description of variables. 
Indeed, statistical analysis of the survey results demonstrates that protes-
tors in Chile tended to be highly engaged in civic life, left-leaning politi-
cally, and deeply concerned with the so-called social deficits of the ne-
oliberal model. Table 2 presents results from a series of logistic regres-
sion models on protest participation, which tested the effects of various 
social and political factors while controlling for demographic influences. 
As would be expected in a context of widespread student mobilization, 
age is negatively correlated with social protest, indicating that young 
people are more likely to take to the streets. Whereas gender has no 
statistically significant effect on protest, education has a strong and con-
sistent relationship: protest is more common among citizens with higher 
levels of education, which likely serves as a facilitator of political en-
gagement.  
Once education is controlled for, however, socioeconomic status 
has a statistically significant negative association with protest participa-
tion in two of the four regression models and falls just short of signifi-
cance in the other two models. The widespread perception that Chile’s 
contemporary social movements are predominantly middle class in char-
acter thus appears to be somewhat misleading; in fact, the findings re-
ported here suggest that better-educated working- and lower-middle-
class youth are the most active protest participants. These social groups 
are likely to have strong aspirations for upward mobility, and they look 
to the government to address social problems that hold them back. In-
deed, protest participants manifest a strong belief that social needs are 
the most important problems facing the country.  
  
  (Re)Politicizing Inequalities 145
 

 
Table 2.  Social and Political Correlates of Protest Participation (Logistic 
Regression Analysis) 
Independent Vari-
ables 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
Demographic 
Indicators 
    
Age -.0371*** 
(.0070) 
-.0379*** 
(.0070) 
-.0383*** 
(.0070) 
-.0372*** 
(.0071) 
Education .2335*** 
(.0603) 
.2302*** 
(.0605) 
.2332*** 
(.0600) 
.2277*** 
(.0599) 
Gender -.1259 
(.2119) 
-.0872 
(.2129) 
-.0508 
(.2110) 
-.0656 
(.2116) 
Socioeconomic 
Status 
-.3071* 
(.1516) 
-.2934 
(.1518) 
-.3008* 
(.1508) 
-.2900 
(.1505) 
Main Problem     
Social Needs .6920** 
(.2210) 
.6711** 
(.2217) 
--- --- 
Corruption --- --- -.1272 
(.3403) 
--- 
Crime --- --- --- -.3560 
(.2362) 
Political Engage-
ment 
    
Political Interest .7106** 
(.2546) 
.7363** 
(.2549) 
.7387** 
(.2542) 
.7315** 
(.2543) 
Left Identity .8442*** 
(.2497) 
.8254*** 
(.2509) 
.8334*** 
(.2503) 
.8095*** 
(.2518) 
Civil Society Partici-
pation 
1.017*** 
(.2187) 
.9800*** 
(.2194) 
.9362*** 
(.2169) 
.9339*** 
(.2167) 
Institutional Partici-
pation 
2.106*** 
(.2487) 
2.122*** 
(.2503) 
2.124*** 
(.2489) 
2.099*** 
(.2488) 
Democratic Dissatis-
faction 
-.0534 
.2506 
--- --- --- 
Populist Attitudes --- .1884* 
(.0827) 
.2005* 
(.0822) 
.1897* 
(.0821) 
Pseudo R-squared 0.3271 0.3326 0.3234 0.3257 
Prob > chi2  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
N 1302 1302 1302 1302 
Note:  * = p < .05; ** = p < .01; *** = p < .001 (standard errors in parentheses). 
Source:  Encuesta Nacional UDP (2015). See Appendix for a description of variables in 
the regression analysis. 
A dummy variable identifying respondents who named a specific social 
need or service (i.e. education, health care, pensions, housing, the envi-
ronment, transportation, or public works) as the principal problem fac-
ing the country is positively related to protest behavior and statistically 
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significant at the .01 level.3 Respondents who identified corruption or 
crime as the most important problem, on the other hand, were less likely 
to protest – although the regression coefficients for these indicators are 
not statistically significant.  
The statistical analysis also suggests that protest behavior is often an 
extension of other forms of civic engagement and not simply an expres-
sion of alienation or discontent. Here, protest participants had higher 
levels of political interest and were more likely to politically self-locate on 
the left despite the presence of a PSCh president at the time the survey 
was conducted.4 They were also more likely to belong to diverse political 
and nonreligious civil society organizations such as unions, parties, pro-
fessional associations, neighborhood councils, charitable associations, 
and sports or cultural groups. Likewise, protestors were more likely to 
have participated in democratic institutional channels like party meetings 
or convincing others to vote. Interestingly, protestors were not more 
inclined to express dissatisfaction with the performance of democracy, 
but their participatory ethos is marked by populist tendencies. For in-
stance, they had a strong faith in the political subjectivity of “the people” 
and were skeptical of a professionalized political establishment that 
claims to speak and act on behalf of the people. Protest participation is 
thus positively related to an index of populist attitudes in the regression 
models. 
These statistical results are indicative of the central challenges to 
democratic representation in contemporary Chile: (i) representative insti-
tutions are (to date) politically stable but increasingly shallow in their 
social roots; (ii) a highly activated and politicized subset of the popula-
tion operates within an overarching context of political withdrawal or 
detachment; and (iii) at least part of this activated subsector retains link-
ages to established parties while pressuring them to deepen redistributive 
social reforms and expand social citizenship rights. Consequently, alt-
hough much social mobilization and protest has occurred outside and 
against the dominant parties of the post-1990 democratic regime, it has 
                                                 
3  Interestingly, these concrete social needs, which are closely tied to specific 
government policies (or the lack thereof) weighed more heavily on protest par-
ticipation than did broader or more abstract economic concerns such as pov-
erty, inequality, and employment, for which outcomes are heavily conditioned 
by macroeconomic forces beyond the government’s control.  
4  Virtually identical results are obtained if an indicator for identification with 
Bachelet’s Nueva Mayoría coalition replaces leftist identity in the regression 
models. Protestors, in short, are more likely to identify with the governing coa-
lition than citizens who do not protest. 
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yet to spawn an electorally competitive new “movement party” such as 
the Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) in Bolivia, much less a populist 
outsider such as Hugo Chávez in Venezuela or Rafael Correa in Ecua-
dor. At the time of writing (late 2016), social protest had yet to be trans-
lated into the kind of electoral protest that is the surest indicator of a 
full-fledged crisis of democratic representation. 
Instead, social mobilization pulled the established center-left coali-
tion back to the left programmatically, at least partially reactivating the 
left–right policy cleavage that had progressively faded over the course of 
the democratic period (Castillo, Madero-Cabib, and Salamovich 2013). 
Bachelet’s “New Majority” expanded the old Concertación by incorporat-
ing the PCCh into its electoral and governing alliance and competing in 
2013 elections on a platform that embraced much of the student move-
ment’s demands. The second Bachelet administration proceeded to im-
plement a major tax reform to help fund social programs, replace the 
binomial electoral system with a more proportional system of representa-
tion, and propose rewriting the military’s constitution. By early 2016, it 
had pushed through Congress a major education reform that was de-
signed to eliminate fees and selective admissions requirements in state-
subsidized schools and provide free university education to some 
165,000 low-income students. Although other parts of the government’s 
education reform package remained pending – including the renationali-
zation of municipal schools – the third of the four “social pillars” of the 
neoliberal model is clearly in transition under Bachelet. Indeed, the mar-
ket-based logic of privatized education has lost significant ground to a 
more universalistic conception of education as a right of social citizen-
ship. Not surprisingly, Bachelet’s reforms have been staunchly opposed 
by business and conservative sectors of Chilean society, which are the 
primary beneficiaries and most ardent defenders of the neoliberal model.  
Whereas the pension and health care pillars of neoliberalism were 
reformed by state technocrats in the absence of significant social mobili-
zation, the education pillar became the focal point of a new politicization 
of inequality in Chilean society, to which democratic institutions were 
slow to respond. Although mass protest activity has tapered off from its 
peak in 2011–2012, social and economic inequalities have clearly re-
turned to the forefront of the political agenda; indeed, according to the 
2015 Latinobarómetro survey, only 5 percent of Chileans said that the 
distribution of income in their society was just, the lowest percentage in 
the region (Latinobarómetro 2015: 67). Chile’s partisan and governing 
institutions have demonstrated a renewed responsiveness to these socie-
tal concerns, but it is yet to be determined whether this belated response 
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is sufficient to reverse the steady erosion of their capacity to articulate 
and represent societal interests. The fraying of the sociopolitical matrix 
implanted during the 1989–1990 regime transition has left the country in 
unchartered political waters; the churning of these waters by the politici-
zation of inequalities is sure to be a driving force in the years ahead. 
Conclusion 
Although many formal models of democracy assume that partisan and 
electoral competition turn on distributive conflicts, the Chilean case 
suggests that the politicization of inequality is neither natural nor inevi-
table; in fact it may vary substantially over time. Party systems and re-
gime institutions may downplay inequalities in an effort to forge a na-
tional consensus or foster technocratic efficiency, but in so doing they 
create representational deficiencies that can induce societal actors to 
articulate and mobilize redistributive claims in extrainstitutional settings. 
So conceived, depoliticization is an unstable institutional equilibrium in 
contexts of acute inequality. Chile sustained such an equilibrium for the 
better part of two decades following its 1990 regime transition. However, 
this equilibrium was shattered by the groundswell of student and popular 
protest in recent years. In the process, this groundswell presented fun-
damental new challenges to one of Latin America’s most resilient and 
stable party systems. Therefore, challenges to representative institutions 
in Chile consist not only of societal withdrawal or detachment but also 
of the extrainstitutional mobilization of new actors. These actors articu-
late redistributive claims that were largely unrecognized by established 
parties and thoroughly incompatible with the social pillars of the neolib-
eral model they constructed. 
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Appendix 
Variables included in Table 1 and Table 2:  
Age: Continuous variable indicating the age of the respondent on their 
last birthday (P54). 
Civil Society Participation: Dummy variable indicating that the respondent 
belongs to any of the nonreligious civil society organizations includ-
ed in P14. 
Corruption: Dummy variable indicating respondents who identified cor-
ruption as the most important problem facing the country (P10).  
Crime: Dummy variable indicating respondents who identified crime as 
the most important problem facing the country (P10).  
Democratic Dissatisfaction: Dummy variable for respondents who indicated 
they are “not very satisfied” or “not at all satisfied” with the func-
tioning of democracy in Chile (P13). 
Education: A 0–9 scale indicating the level of education achieved by the 
respondent (P59). 
Gender: Dummy variable indicating respondent’s gender (P53; female = 
1).  
Institutional Participation: Dummy variable indicating that the respondent 
has participated in a party meeting or tried to convince others to 
vote (P16A & B). 
Left Identity: Dummy variable for respondents who indicated that they 
identified or sympathized with the political positions on the left 
(P23).  
Party Identification: Dummy variable indicating whether or not a respond-
ent identified a political party that “best represents your interests, 
beliefs, and values” (P21). 
Political Interest: Dummy variable for respondents who indicated that they 
are “somewhat interested” or “very interested” in politics (P15).  
Populist Attitudes: An index (0–4) constructed by summing the dummy 
variables from four questions on populist attitudes. Respondents 
received a “1” on each question if they agreed or strongly agreed 
that “politicians in congress have to follow the will of the people 
(P41A), that “the most important decisions should be taken by the 
people and not by politicians” (P41B), that “the political differences 
between the elite and the people are greater than the differences 
that exist among the people” (P41C), and that they “would prefer to 
be represented by a common citizen rather than by an experienced 
politician” (P41D).  
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Protest Participation: Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent 
participated in at least one of the following types of protest activity 
in the past year: a demonstration (P16C), property destruction or 
looting (P16D), occupation of a building (P16E), blocking a street 
(P16F), or a strike (P16G). 
Social Needs: Dummy variable indicating whether the respondent named 
one of the following social needs or public services as the most im-
portant problem facing the country: education, health care, pen-
sions, housing, the environment, public works, or public transporta-
tion (P10).  
Socioeconomic Status: A 1–5 scale indicating the respondent’s material well-
being based on household and living conditions (P73, with the scale 
inverted so that higher scores reflect a higher socioeconomic sta-
tus).  
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La (Re)politización de desigualdades: movimientos, partidos y 
ciudadanía social en Chile 
Resumen: Durante los 20 años posteriores a la transición democrática 
de 1989-1990, la política chilena se caracterizó por formas estables de 
representación política basada en partidos, niveles relativamente bajos de 
movilización social y un consenso tecnocrático en torno a un modelo de 
desarrollo neoliberal que generó rápidos y sostenidos, aunque altamente 
desiguales, patrones de crecimiento económico. Esta matriz sociopolítica 
fue desafiada, sin embargo, cuando cientos de miles de estudiantes y sus 
partidarios salieron a las calles para protestar contra las desigualdades 
educativas, mientras que un número menor de manifestantes se movilizó 
alrededor de una plétora de otras reivindicaciones laborales, ambientales 
y de derechos indígenas. Esta ola de protesta social se produjo en un 
contexto de creciente desvinculación de los ciudadanos chilenos de los 
partidos tradicionales y de las instituciones representativas, y perforó el 
aura de inevitabilidad y consenso que rodeaba el modelo económico del 
país. La oleada de protesta popular significó el fin de una era política 
pos-transición en Chile y el amanecer de una nueva época definida por la 
repolitización de las desigualdades sociales y económicas, incluyendo 
debates vigorosos sobre los pilares sociales del modelo neoliberal y el 
alcance de los derechos sociales de ciudadanía. El caso chileno arroja 
nueva luz sobre los procesos por los que las desigualdades llegan a politi-
zarse o despolitizarse en diferentes contextos estructurales, instituciona-
les e ideacionales. 
Palabras clave: América Latina, Chile, transición democrática, partidos 
políticos, movimientos sociales 
 
